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CASE NOTES
An editorial comment accompanying a Note represents the opinion of the student who prepared
the Note and does not necessarily represent the viewpoint of any other member of the Editorial
Board
Edited by

Robert L. Greenwald
Constitutionality Of Statute Providing For
Imprisonment Of Indigent Unable To Pay Fine
And Court Costs-Kelly v. Schoonfield, 285 F.
Supp. 732 (D. Md. 1968). Plaintiffs were convicted in the Municipal Court of Baltimore for
violating Chapter 70 of the Acts of 1068 which
granted the Governor authority under certain
conditions to declare a state of emergency in
specified areas and to promulgate executive orders,
including the power to establish curfews. It further
provided that any violation would be punishable
as a misdeamenor, subjecting the offender to a
fine of not more than $100 or not more than 60
days incarceration, or both. During the Baltimore
riots in April, 1968, the Governor established
curfews and each plaintiff was found guilty of
violating it. Four of the plaintiffs were sentenced
to pay fines of $50 and $4 court costs. Two of the
plaintiffs were sentenced to pay fines of $100 and
$4 court costs.
Unable to pay the fines, the plaintiffs were
committed to jail pursuant to sections 1 and 4 of
Article 38 of the Annotated Code of Maryland.
Section 1 provides for confinement for guilty
persons defaulting in payment while section 4
provides the time of incarceration. By its standards, a person may be confined one day for each
dollar of fine and costs, but not to exceed 30 days
for costs and fines less than $100, 60 days for fines
and costs between $100 and $500, and 90 days for
fines and costs over $500.
Plaintiffs, in a class action before a three judge
District Court, sought a declaratory judgement
that Article 38, sections 1 and 4, when applied to
indigents deny them equal protection of the laws,
and violate the Eighth Amendment. The State of
Maryland was given leave to intervene as a party
defendant, and the defendants filed a motion to
dismiss. The parties agreed that the validity of the
statute as applied to the plaintiffs, and others
similarly situated, was the only question for the
court.

Richard P. Vogelman
The court found there was no merit in the
Eighth Amendment claim. The trial court could
have imposed sentences of 60 days and the plaintiffs were not being required to serve for any
period longer than that. With regard to the eqaal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the court held that it was not violated simply
because the statute required the commitment of
an indigent who is in default of payment of a fine.
The court quoted with approval language f.-m
.Prinitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y.
1965):
The sentence was not imposed upon petitioner
because he was indigent; it was visited upon him
because he had committed a crime. And once
committed, petitioner has no constitutional right
that another defendant, no matter what his
economic status, rich or poor, receive the same
sentence for the same offense.
The court also found that sections 1 and 4 of
Article 38 met the constitutional standard that in
defining a class subject to legislation the distinctions that are drawn have some relevance to the
purpose for which the classification is made. The
commitment of convicted defendants who default
in the payment of fines, the court found, imposes a
burden on a defined class to achieve a permissible
end-giving guilty persons an appropraite punishment.
However, the court did find the equal protection
clause violated by the addition of costs to the
amount of the fine in determining the time to be
served. First, the statute which permitted the
curfew imposition did not include costs as part of
the fine. Further, the court found that the practice
in Baltimore was not to include costs in the
commitnent-no time is served for nonpayment
of costs. Since not all persons were required to
serve time for default of costs, the State could not
constitutionally include costs in computing the
plaintiff's sentences. The court thus ordered the
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warden to release the plaintiff and all persons
similarly situated.
Twenty-Six Month Delay Between Arrest And
Trial Prejudicial-UnitedStates v. Reed, 285 F.
Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1968). Defendant prior to trial
for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and the
interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle
renewed his motion to dismiss the indictment for
unnecessary delay under Rule 48 (b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and denial of his
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. He had
allegedly stolen the car in the District of Columbia
on January 21, 1966 and had been in an accident
with it the next day in Maryland. The defendant
was tried on certain traffic offenses resulting from
the accident and eventually received a one year
sentence from the Maryland court.
In July, 1966 the defendant was indicted in the
District of Columbia for the theft. The arraignment was held in August, 1966. When the defendant failed to appear, a Bench Warrant was issued
and forwarded to the United States Marshal in
Baltimore. The defendant was released in January,
1967 but due to an administrative mistake the
detainer was not honored and he returned to the
District of Columbia. It was not until he was
arrested for another offense in March, 1968 that
the defendant was finally arraigned for the car
theft. The time between the alleged offense and
the beginning of the trial was twenty-six months.
The court first outlined the factors in a case
alleging the denial of a speedy trial: the length of
the delay; the reason for the delay; the diligence
of the prosecutor, court, and defense counsel; and
the reasonable possibility of prejudice resulting
from the delay. Considering the six month delay
between the Maryland arrest and the indictment,
the court found it "unfortunate" but not fatal to
the government's case. The government's argument that the delay in bringing the defendant to
trial was due to the ten month imprisonment in
Maryland was rejected by the court. It found that
the government had made no effort to have the
defendant temporarily released, and that while
cost and difficulty of transportation could be a
factor in some situations they were not here. Also,
because the defendant was not personally served a
copy of the indictment he could not waive his right
to a speedy trial since he had no knowledge of the
pending charge and was powerless to assert his
rights due to imprisonment, ignorance, and lack
of legal advice.
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Still, the Court stated, the defendant could have
been tried when he was released from the Maryland prison. But due to the administrative mistake
the defendant lived for fourteen months in the
District of Columbia without being picked up.
Consequently, the court held that the twenty-six
month delay between arrest in Maryland and trial
was due to the negligence of the government.
With regard to the possibility of prejudice
resulting from the delay, the Court found that the
defendant was unable to tell his attorney anything
about the alleged offense. Psychiatric testimony
revealed that the defendant had a 65-70 I.Q. and
might have been mentally defective. The government argued that the memory loss was constant
and not the result of the long delay. The court
disagreed and held that the twenty-six month
delay due to the negligence of the government had
prejudiced the defendant and he was thus entitled
to a dismissal.
Marijuana Discovered By Frisk Inadmissible
Since Not A Possible Weapon-People v. Britton,
70 Cal. Rptr. 586 (Ct. App. 1968). At 2 a.m. two
police officers were patrolling the area of a store
whose burglar alarm was not operating properly
when they observed defendant's car and another's
parked in the store's parking lot. The other car
left and defendant circled the lot before leaving.
When a few minutes later the officers noticed
defendant making a U turn near the store, they
stopped him for questioning. Noticing the barrel
of a rifle protruding from under the front seat and
smelling liquor on Britton's breath, one of the
officers told defendant to remove all articles from
his clothing and place them on the trunk of the car.
Defendant's clothing was then patted to check
for weapons and when the officer felt a soft bulge
under the jacket, he removed a package from
defendant's pocket. The package contained
marijuana and Britton was convicted of illegal
possession of marijuana, from which he appealed.
Noting that the officers did not intend to
arrest defendant at the time they stopped him and
that there was not probable cause for arrest, the
court of appeals examined the legality of the
search under the stop and frisk doctrine [Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40 (1968)]. It was held that a frisk was
justified after the officers saw the rifle under the
front seat, but that the scope of a permissible
frisk was exceeded by requiring defendant to
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empty his pockets and by the officer removing the
soft package, which had no use as a weapon.
Applying the exclusionary rule to find the evidence
inadmissible, the court reversed defendant's
conviction.
Comment: On the facts of the case, the decision
seems to follow the dictates of Terry and Sibron.
The following are the permissible steps which can
be taken as a result of those decisions: 1) If a
reasonably prudent man would have believed the
suspect was armed and presented a threat, a
policeman is justified in conducting a search; 2)
The search must be limited to a patting of the
suspect's outer clothing; 3) Discovery of weapons
is the only purpose for such a search and, thus,
only after weapons are felt can the officer reach
under the outer clothing. In the present case,
assuming as the court does that there was not
probable cause for arrest, requiring Britton to
empty his pockets and the reaching under his
jacket for a soft package which could not have
appeared to be a weapon were acts not sanctioned
by Terry and Sibron.
At least two questions, however, are left unanswered by those Supreme Court decisions.
What if while conducting a lawful frisk an officer
feels an object which he believes could be a weapon,
but it turns out not to be? The problem is in
defining what a weapon is. In Sibron Chief Justice
Warren seems to have given the broadest possible
scope to the term by defining weapons as "concealed objects which might be used as instruments
of assault". (Emphasis added). It can thus be
argued that any hard object of knife size or larger
is a possible instrument of assault, for even if the
object has no pointed parts that could be used for
stabbing, if it has any weight it could be used in
the same manner as a club. If, for example, the
marijuana had been in a bottle, can, or similar
hard object instead of a plastic bag, the search
would be reasonable since the container would be a
possible weapon. But would the marijuana itself
be admissible merely because it was inside an
object which could be used as a weapon? The only
hint of an answer to this question is a statement in
Terry which is a paraphrase of the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Fortas in Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967): "Thus, evidence may
not be introduced if it was discovered by means of
a seizure and search which were not reasonably
related in scope to the justification for their
initiation." Since the marijuana would have been

discovered by a justified means due to the container's possible use as a weapon, it could be
argued it should be admissible as evidence.
A second unanswered question concerns evidence
which appears by accident as a result of the weapon
being removed from the clothing. If, for example,
Britton had a gun and as it was being pulled from
his pocket a package of marijuana fell out of the
pocket, would the marijuana be admissible? If the
rule from Terry quoted above is applied, the
marijuana would be admissible since it was discovered by a means of a search reasonably related
to removing the weapon.
Life Imprisonment Without Benefit Of Parole
Is Cruel And Unusual Punishment When Applied
To Juveniles-Workman v. Commonwealth, 429
S. W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968). Defendants were convicted of forcible rape and sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of parole. Both were
14 years of age at the time of the crime in 1958.
They appealed on the grounds that the sentence
violated their Eighth Amendment right against
cruel and unusual punishment. The Kentucky
Supreme Court reversed that portion of the
judgment which precluded parole.
The court pointed out that the task of assigning
a penalty to a crime properly belongs to the
legislature. No legislative act had before been held
to be violative of the Eighth Amendment's guarantees. Part of the reason for this was that the
definition of cruel and unusual punishment had
never been determined with any degree of exactness. The court mentioned three tests to determine
what punishments do fall within that category.
They are:
1) In view of all the circumstances, is the
punishment of such a character as to shock
the general conscience and to violate the
principles of fundamental fairness?
2) Is the punishment, when compared with the
offense, found to be greatly disproportionate?
3) Does the punishment go beyond what is
necessary to achieve the aim of the public
intent as expressed by the legislature?
In holding that portion of the sentence which
denied parole to be unconstitutional, the court
found that to deny parole to juveniles did shock
the general conscience of society. The obvious
intent of the legislature in enacting that provision
which allowed the preclusion of parole in rape
convictions, was to protect society from incorrigible
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individuals. But the court expressed the belief
that incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Montgomery
maintained that the majority opinion shocks the
conscience. It would allow the defendants to "be
paroled and turned loose on society to rape and
rob again". He felt that the defendants "richly
deserved" the death penalty.
Vague Vagrancy Statute Violates Constitutional
Rights-City of Portland v. James, 444 P.2d 554
(Ore. 1968). James was fined for a violation of a
Portland ordinance which read:
Between the hours of I and 5 o'clock A.M. it shall
be unlawful for any person to roam or be upon any
street, alley or public place, without having and
disclosing a lawful purpose.
In previously construing the regulation the Oregon
courts, in effect, had substituted "having an
unlawful purpose" for the words "without having
and disclosing a lawful purpose". The Supreme
Court of Oregon held the statute to be a violation
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution and of certain articles
of the state constitution.
The court reasoned that the statute could have
only two possible interpretations: first, it could
mean that an officer could make an arrest only if
he observes conduct evincing a purpose to commit
a particular crime; or secondly, it may mean that
an officer could make an arrest even if he cannot
describe the crime which he feels the conduct will
lead to. If the former is the correct construction
then the ordinance was mere surplusage for a valid
arrest can be made without it in those circumstances. Therefore, the court continued, the
ordinance falls within the second category and
purports to make criminal the mere presence of a
person on the streets where a police officer has
the suspicion that the suspect does not have a lawful purpose in being there.
The evil in this is that "it invites arbitrary and
discriminatory entorcement" because of a
"criterion for arrest... too vague to provide a
standard adequate for the protection of constitutional rights". This ordinance would "render the
requirement of probable cause to effect a valid
arrest an illusory protection". The intense constitutional concern in "the interest of freedom of
movement on the streets and the attendant
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interests of privacy and human dignity" is flaunted
by this vague statute.
The court expressly denies any reflection on
statutes which allow for arrest of those who loiter
or prowl "under circumstances that warrant alarm
for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity". Nor did they intend this decision to be any
comment upon the police procedure of stopping
and questioning "persons who arouse a reasonable
suspicion that they are connected with criminal
activity".
Right To Court Appointed Counsel Not Affected
By Possibility Of Employment-State v. Cowart,
162 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1968). Appelants were
indicted for assault and battery and requested the
court to appoint counsel. Refusing to appoint
counsel, the judge, stating that the area had many
jobs for any one who wanted to work, postponed
trial until the next term of court six months later.
The implication was that appellants should become employed during the interim so that they
could hire their own attorney. They had not
retained counsel by the next term, from which the
judge concluded, "it is because you are either too
lazy, or do not want to work". The trial took
place with appellants lacking representation and
they were convicted of assault and battery of a
high and aggravated nature. Writ of habeus
corpus was applied for on the ground of lack of
representation but was denied by the county
judge on the basis that appellants were ablebodied and capable of earning a living.
Reversing and ordering a new trial, the supreme
court held the issue to be whether an accused in
fact can afford counsel, not whether he ought to be
able to. Even though the trial judge noted that
appellants were employed during part of the six
month period, the supreme court viewed as controlling the lack of evidence in the record which
would show that appellants were able after the
payment of necessary living expenses to employ
counsel. The implication from the court's language
is that a defendant would be entitled to counsel
even if he turned down or quit a job which would
enable him to hire counsel:
It is our conclusion that the appellants were
indigent and entitled to the appointment of counsel
at the time request therefor was made by them
regardless of whether the appellants ought to have
been able to earn sufficient funds with which to
employ counsel.
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Wiretap Evidence Held Inadmissible In State
And Federal Proceedings-Lee v. Florida, 88
S. Ct. 2096 (1968); Hanna v. United States, 393
F. 2d 700 (5th Cir. 1968). In Lee the defendant
was convicted of violating Florida's lottery laws.
Prior to his arrest, police officers, utlizing a nearby
house, installed a wiretapping device on the
defendant's telephone which was on a four party
line. This particular instrument enabled the
police to hear and record all of the defendant's
incoming and outgoing calls for more than a week
without lifting their receiver and giving a telltale
click. At the accused's trial, which resulted in his
conviction, several of these recordings were admitted into evidence. The Florida higher courts
affirmed and approved the use of this evidence.
The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the officers' conduct violated Section
605 of the Federal Communications Act, and the
recordings gained thereby could not be admitted
into evidence. The Court noted that this section
forbids, any person from intercepting and divulging a telephone communication. This was
indeed an "interception" within the meaning of
the statute despite the fact that the defendant's
telephone was on a party line, which meant his
calls were susceptible to being overheard by a
third party. Here the officers arranged to have a
telephone receiver connected to Lee's line withot
his knowledge. This is distinguishable from the
situation where they might pick up the receiver
and listen with the consent of one of the parties
to the call. The Court emphasized that the right
to privacy would not be compromised because a
person uses a party line.
The Court then said that evidence gained by
violation of this federal statute is not admissible
in a state court. It noted that Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) imposed an exclusionary rule
in order to insure that a state could not adapt
rules of evidence calculated to permit the invasion
of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Similarly, a state court should not be able to condone
violations of rights specifically protected by
federal statute. The Court also emphasized that
in view of the Supremacy Clause
No court, state or federal, may serve as an accomplice in the willful transgression of the Laws of
the United States, laws by which "the Judges in
every state are bound."
Justices Black, Harlan and White dissented.
They were of the persuasion that it was the function of Congress and not of the Court to decide

if an exclusionary rule should emanate from this
federal statute. justice Harlan noted that this
statute had been in effect for a long period of time,
and Congress has had sufficient time to act if
it so desired.
In Hanna the defendant was prosecuted for
wire fraud and wagering by wire. His phone had
become the focus of an investigation by the telephone company as the result of a device that he
used which enabled him to make long distance
calls without payment of tolls. In the course of
its investigation the telephone company placed a
recorder on the line to determine if it was being
defrauded. Based on information gained from
these tapes, federal agents obtained a search
warrant for Hanna's home where they found and
seized the aforementioned device and also bookmaking paraphernalia. The accused filed a motion
to suppress this evidence which was denied by
the district court.
The court of appeals reversed and granted the
motion. It held that this conduct violated Section
605 of the Federal Communications Act. The
telephone agents came within the section's prohibition that "no person" shall intercept and
divulge such communications. It rejected the
Government's claim that these employees fell
under the provision of this act that permits employees who have to do with the sending or receiving of communication to divulge its substance
upon the demand of lawful authority. These
agents, the court found, do not fall within this
class since they do not actually receive or transmit
communications. To find that they were so included would run contrary to the policy of the
framers of the law that it is better even if some
criminals should go free, than the privacy of all
individuals be invaded. The court also rejected
the Government's contention that by his illegal
use of the telephone, Hanna implicitly authorized
interception of his communications. This reasoning
offends the protection that must be given to the
right to privacy.
The court also noted that the telephone company's conduct would be impermissible under
the reasoning in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.,
347 (1968), which imposed the requirement that
wire tapping be regulated by a search warrant as
are other searches and seizures. (Hanna arose
before Katz was decided.) The fact that a search
warrant is not available to the telephone company
adds further emphasis to the illegality, indeed,
unconstitutionality of its surveillance.
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Miranda Warnings: Right to "Speak To" Or
"Contact" Attorney Not Equivalent To Right To
"Presence" Of Attorney-Windsor v. United
States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968), and Duckett
v. State, 240 A. 2d 332 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968).
One of the warnings required by Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is that a defendant
be advised of his right to "the presence of an
attorney" during interrogations. Two courts were
recently called upon to interpret this requirement
and both found the use of certain other wording
insufficient to meet the requirement.
In Windsor, the defendant was convicted of
transporting a stolen motor vehicle in interstate
commerce. He and a companion, Robert Sharp,
had been stopped by police in Florida for a traffic
violation. Sharp was unable to post bond and was
taken to jail. When he failed to prove ownership
of the vehicle, he was questioned by two FBI
agents. Sharp admitted that a friend in the state
of Washington had asked Windsor and him to
return an automobile to a rental agency but that
they had told the agency that the car was defective
and the friend wanted another one. Sharp further
stated that he and Windsor were given a car on
the basis of this false representation and shortly
thereafter left the State of Washington.
Taking a key which Sharp gave them, the FBI
agents proceeded to the motel room shared by
Sharp and Windsor. They identified themselves to
Windsor and told him they were looking for
Sharp's draft card. They informed Windsor that
he was not under arrest and was not being detained in any way and was not to construe this
as being detained; that he did not have to make a
statement; that any statement he did make could
be used against him in a court of law; that he
could "speak to" an attorney or anyone else before
he said anything at all; that he could terminate
the interview at any time; and that in the event
he was arrested an attorney would be appointed
for him by the court. According to the agents'
testimony, Windsor acknowledged that he understood their warnings and then made an oral admission of facts similar to those admitted earlier
by Sharp. Windsor was arrested and taken to jail.
The following day Windsor signed a written
statement containing the admitted facts and
warnings which were substantially identical to
those given prior to his oral statement. Windsor
also wrote the following paragraph at the request
and dictation of Government agents: "I have
read this three page statement & state it is true &
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complete to the best of my Nolage [sic] I have
initaled [sic] the other to [sic] pages, all corrections, & I signed this below."
The court of appeals held that Windsor's oral
and written statements were inadmissible because
the defendant had not been given the full Miranda
warnings. Merely telling him that he could speak
with an attorney or anyone else before he said
anything at all was not the same as informing him
that he was entitled to the presence of an attorney
during interrogation and that one would be appointed if he could not afford one. Windsor was
clearly in custody at the time of the written
statement. The court also concluded that the
Miranda warnings were required prior to the oral
statement even though the agents had informed
the defendant that he was not under arrest. At
that time the focus of the investigation had already centered on Windsor because of Sharp's
statement. The court indicated that constitutional
requirements could not be so easily avoided by
mere statements of the police which are contrary
to the facts of the situation. Therefore, since
Windsor's statements had been admitted into
evidence by the trial court, the judgment was
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
In Duckett, defendants Duckett, Smith, and Lee
were convicted of kidnapping and rape. According to the evidence adduced at trial, the
defendants were among six male youths who had
picked up Mr. and Mrs. Robinson hitchhiking on
the evening of Saturday, September 24, 1966.
After stopping at a party fbr approximately an
hour, the group, with an additional unidentified
male youth, proceeded a short distance and then
stopped, the driver announcing that the car had a
flat tire. The evidence further showed that when
Mr. Robinson got out of the car to investigate,
defendant Lee shot at him and the youths drove
off without him, stopping again at a field where
they beat and raped Mrs. Robinson.
Duckett, Lee, and Smith were each arrested
separately during the following day. Duckett and
Lee were identified by Mr. Robinson from photographs which the police had. When arrested,
Duckett was driving an automobile matching the
description given by Mr. Robinson. Mrs. Swann,
who resided at the place where the party was
held, directed the police to a nearby farm. One
of Smith's co-workers at this farm told police
that Smith had bragged about raping a woman
the previous night. These statements, together
with a pair of stained pants allegedly belonging
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to Smith, led to the arrest of the third defendant.
Arresting officers gave each of the three defendants substantially identical warnings that
anything he said could be used against him, that
he had a right to remain silent, that he had a
right to "contact" his own attorney, and that
the court would appoint an attorney if he could
not afford one. Each of the three defendants was
then asked whether he wanted an attorney and
each replied that he did not. In reply to questions
concerning the early morning hours, Duckett
stated that he had been with his wife, but then
changed his story. After advising Lee of his rights,
the officers questioned him in the police cruiser,
but he claimed he knew nothing about the kidnapping and "never saw a man or woman the
night before." After advising Smith of his rights,
the police obtained a full confession of the crime
from him.
The two issues on appeal were the legality of
the arrests and the admissibility of the defendants'
oral statements. The problem arose with the
arrests because the arresting officer did not make
oath or affirmation before the magistrate when
he obtained the arrest warrants. However, despite
the invalidity of the arrest warrants and despite
the fact that the officers, in making the arrests,
purported to do so by authority of the warrants,
the court held that the arrests were lawful because there existed probable cause to arrest in
each case.
In regard to the second issue, the court held
that merely advising a person who has been
arrested and who is about to be questioned with
reference to the crime that he has a right "to
contact" a lawyer does not comport with Miranda
requirements concerning the warning of his right
to the presence of counsel. Even though this
warning was coupled with an inquiry as to whether
the defendant wanted an attorney, the court
did not believe this constituted the equivalent of
advising the person that he "has the right to
consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer
with him during interrogation," as required by
Miranda at page 471. Furthermore, the questioning in these three situations was the type of
custodial interrogation which Miranda was aimed
at curtailing. Each defendant had just been
placed under arrest. The questioning of Lee and
Duckett took place in and near a police car and
Smith's interrogation was conducted at the police
station. Therefore, these statements should not

have been admitted into evidence. Their admission
at trial was reversible, not harmless, error. Smith's
and Lee's statements conflicted with their trial
testimony while Duckett's statement was internally conflicting, thus conveying the impression
to the jury that he was not truthful. The judgments were accordingly reversed and the case
was remanded for a new trial.
Comment: These cases point out the importance
attached to the exact wording which was used in
Miranda. Police officers must exercise extreme
care to convey the full significance of the required
warnings to the suspect. In some ways, Windsor
is a somewhat questionable example. Windsor
was in his own motel room and was informed
that he was in no way detained or compelled to
talk to the officers. There is very little in this
case to indicate the type of custodial interrogation
which Miranda was aimed at preventing. Miranda
speaks of circumstances which are likely to affect
substantially the individual's "will to resist and
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise
do so freely." On the other hand, the defendant
in Windsor was not very intelligent, as indicated
by his written statement. Since the goal is to
inform individuals of their rights, perhaps greater
care should be taken with less-educated individuals. But it is entirely possible that such an
individual would not understand the fine distinction which the court draws between "speak to"
and "presence."
Miranda Applied To Statements Used For
Impeachment Purposes-Groshart v. United
States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968). Defendant
was arrested and convicted by a jury of having
smuggled and concealed marijuana and of having
smuggled amphetamine tablets and barbiturate
capsules. He appealed.
The only issue on appeal was whether certain
statements made by the defendant had been
properly admitted into evidence at the trial.
Shortly after his arrest, the defendant was interrogated by a Customs Agent who warned him
that he had a right to remain silent, that any
statement he made could be used against him,
and that he had a right to get an attorney at any
time. During the course of the interrogation,
Groshart informed the officers that a person
identified only as "John" had asked him if he
would drive the station wagon to Mexico for the
purpose of picking up a load of marijuana. Groshart
further stated that he received the car, drove it
to Mexico, and parked it for four hours near a
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park in Tijuana. At the trial, however, the defendant stated that he had obtained the car
through a friend named Dick Long, that he had
gone to Mexico for his own entertainment, that
he had parked the car in Tijuana for ten hours,
and that he had not known of the presence of the
contraband in the vehicle until the inspection.
The prosecution sought to impeach Groshart's
testimony with the statements he had made
following his arrest. The District Court ruled that
certain portions of the statements were admissible
for impeachment so long as no reference was
made to defendant's statements regarding the
purpose of obtaining marijuana. The court instructed the jury that evidence of the earlier,
inconsistent statements was admitted only for
impeachment purposes.
The warnings by the Customs Agent did not
conform to the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), because Groshart was
not advised that an attorney would be appointed
to represent him if he was indigent and that he
had a right to the presence of an attorney during
any questioning. Nevertheless, the District Court
ruled that certain parts of the statements could
be admitted for the sole purpose of impeachment.
This ruling was based on such cases as Walder v.
United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1953), and Tate v,
United States, 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
(Although Walder dealt with the Fourth Amendment right against illegal searches, the rationale
would also seem to apply to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.)
The court of appeals reversed this ruling of the
district court. The court indicated that Walder
had been undermined by Miranda and quoted
from the Supreme Court in the latter case:
In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory
by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trail or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove
guilt by implication. These statements are i~wriminoting in any meaningful sense of the ward and may
not be used without the full warnings and effective
waiver requiredfor any other statement. [emphasis
supplied in Groshart]
The court also discussed certain District of
Columbia cases, including Johnson v. United
States, 344 F.2d 163 (1964); White v. United
States, 349 F.2d 965 (1965); and Inge v. United
States, 356 F.2d 345 (1966), each of which significantly retreated from the broad language set
down earlier in Tate. In general, these cases held
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that illegally obtained statements which bear
directly on a defendant's guilt or innocence could
not be admitted even for the purpose of impeachment.
Based on this analysis, the court held that if
statements are obtained from a defendant in
violation of the Miranda rules and if the interrogation relates to an offense for which the defendant is ultimately brought to trial, those
statements, as well as any portions thereof, may
not be used against the defendant at the trial
for any purpose whatsoever.
Judge Byrne dissented on the ground that the
quote from Miranda was merely a reference, in
dictum, to the power of evidence to impeach by
implication whereas Walder is still the rule regarding direct impeachment of a defendant's
perjurious testimony. He also stated that the
Walder doctrine does not deter defendants from
testifying, but only from testifying falsely.
Comment: The issue in this case presents a
difficult problem. If illegally obtained evidence is
excluded for impeachment purposes, the defendant can resort to perjurious testimony, shielded
by the prosecution's inability to contradict his
untruths. On the other hand, if such evidence is
admissible for impeachment purposes, the privilege of an accused to testify on his own behalf
would be meaningless since he could do so only
on condition that every incompetent confession
wrung from him by secret or belligerent police
interrogations would become evidence against
him. Practically speaking, it is probably of little
value to instruct a jury only to use certain evidence for impeachment purposes. Thus, there is
no easy solution.
The court in Inge attempted to compromise by
stating that only illegally obtained evidence concerning lawful acts, collateral issues, or minor
points should be admitted for impeachment. As
Groshart points out, these distinctions are essentially meaningless when applied to a chain of
intimately connected events. Illegal evidence
admissible under this test may take on a different
import than it would when placed in the total
context of events. Furthermore, this theory is not
in keeping with Walder, in which the evidence of
prior possession of narcotics was neither lawful,
collateral, nor minor.
The court in Groshartrelies on certain statements
in Miranda. In that these statements were only
dictum in the Supreme Court opinion, it is difficult
to disagree with the dissent in Groshart that
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Walder represents the present law. However, the
whole thrust of Mirandawas that the Constitution
protected individuals from certain police methods,
regardless whether some of these individuals had
in fact committed the crimes of which they are
accused. The police should obtain proper evidence
to impeach, as well as to convict, a defendant.
Wheeler v. United States, 382 F.2d 998 (10th Cir.
1967). It is on this basis that several recent cases
such as Grosharthave attempted to limit Walder
and Tate. Thus, although Walder is still nominally
the law, whether the Supreme Court would condude that it has any vitality after Miranda is
still uncertain.
Prosecutor Must Disclose Exculpatory Evidence
-Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288 (5th Cir.
1968). Defendant was convicted of rape. The only
eyewitness to the attack gave a statement to
the police that she could positively identify the
prosecutrix, but believed that the defendant's
complexion was too dark for him to be the attacker. The eyewitness' description of the attacker
did not fit the description of the defendant. The
defense attorney was not given notice that the
witness could not identify the attacker. He was
given only her name and address, and he was
unable to contact the witness before the trial.
The court in reversing the conviction held that
the prosecuting attorney was under a duty to
disclose to the defense the exculpatory statements
of the witness. The court rejected the argument
that the state had met its duty by revealing the
name and address of the witness. The purpose of a
trial is as much the aquittal of an innocent person
as it is the conviction of a guilty one. In view of
the disparity between the investigating powers
of the state and the defendant, the state has the
burden to disclose significant evidence. The court
concluded that the withholding of exculpatory
evidence offended fundamental conceptions of
fair trial essential to due process, even in absence
of bad faith on the part of the prosecutor.
Interrogation Of Accused Without Counsel
Permitted-Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d
371 (9th Cir. 1968). Defendant was convicted of
aiding in a bank robbery. His conviction was
based upon an oral confession taken by police.
Though they knew that the accused was represented by counsel, the police failed to give his
counsel notice of the intended interview. Counsel
was not present during the taking of the confession.
Affirming the conviction, the court found that the
record supported the finding that the defendant

was fully and fairly advised of his constitutional
rights which he voluntarily waived. The court in
holding that there was a knowing waiver, rejected the argument that there could be no waiver
unless counsel was present to advise the suspect.
The court said it found no precedent that an
accused may only be interrogated by police in the
presence of his lawyer.
The dissent argued that neglect to notify counsel
of a planned interrogation is as effective in preventing consultation as the physical barrier in
Escobedo. The dissent also thought Canon 9 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics placed a responsibility upon prosecuting lawyers not to sanction,
or take advantage of, statements obtained by
Government agents from a person represented by
counsel, in the absence of such counsel.
Entrapment-Burden Of Proof-PrattiV. United
States, 389 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1968). Defendant
was found guilty of violating narcotic laws. His
defense was entrapment and there was evidence
that would permit a jury to find entrapment. The
trial court refused to give the defendant's requested instruction which would have put the
burden of proof on the government that there was
no entrapment. The instruction given by the trial
court did not give any reference to burden of proof.
The court in reversing the conviction held that the
instruction on entrapment should have put the
burden on the government to show that defendant's
wrongful conduct did not result from entrapment.
Registration And Self-Incrimination-United
States v. Macouronne, 283 F. Supp. 87(D. Mass.
1968) and United States v. Covington, 282 F. Supp.
886(S.D. Ohio 1968). In Makouronne, defendant
was convicted of dealing with depressant drugs
without registering with the proper authorities.
In Covington, defendant was convicted of acquiring
marihuana without paying an imposed tax and
without registering. Both defendants raised the
defense that registration violated their Fifth
Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination.
This argument was rejected by the court in Malcouronne, which held that the activity being
regulated by the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic
Act is essentially non-criminal and regulatory,
and is a proper subject for federal legislation
because of the public health and safety involved.
The court in Covington accepted the defense
holding that a reading of the statute involved
disclosed that it was primarily directed at persons
inherently suspect of criminal activities, and those
who paid the tax were subject to having their

CASE NOTES

names published in lists made available to interested prosecuting authorities. The court found the
hazards of self-incrimination substantial and
appreciable. The defendant was required to supply
information unrelated to any records which he
may have maintained; there was no public aspect
to the information sought, and the requirements
were directed to a selective group inherently
suspect of criminal activities.
Government Can Not Require Specific Phrases
In A Handwriting Exemplar-United States v.
Green, 282 F. Supp. 373 (S.D. Ind. 1967). The
defendant was indicted with having filed false
and fraudulent claims against the United States.
The Government filed a motion to require the
defendant to submit handwriting exemplars
including specifically the names which the defendant allegedly wrote on the invoices used in the
fraud. The Government argued that these exemplars fell outside the scope of the protection of
the Fifth Amendment. It argued that these exemplars are in the nature of real evidence and
under the doctrine announced in Schmerber v.
California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966); and Gilbert v.
Calijornia, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and not testimonial in nature.
The defendant countered by saying first that in
Gilbert, and in two circuit court cases interpretating it, the defendants had volunteered the writings
and later objected to their use. Here the defendant
never consented to any examplars. Secondly,
here where the corpus of the crime, forgery, requires proof of the unlawful signatures, and since
present handwriting analysis is so accurate, to
require the defendant to produce replicas of the
signatures on the forged documents constitutes
forcing him into a communicative act as to an
element of the crime and is incriminating.
The court recognized that there is a nebulous
area between acts that are clearly free from Fifth
Amendment objections, and those that are not.
Viewing the practicalities of the matter, however,
the court recognizes that the defendant is correct
when he states that an exemplar would be just as
incriminating as a verbal statement. To force him
to write the names found on the notes would be so
like a communicative act that it would be an
infringement upon the spirit of the constitutional
prohibition against compelling the accused to be a
witness against himself. The Government's motion
was denied.
Circumstantial Evidence Sufficient To Prove
Venue-State v. Wardenburg, 158 N.W.2d 147
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(Iowa 1968). Defendant was arrested and tried for
forgery. The trial judge directed a verdict for the
defendant on the ground that the prosecution had
failed to establish venue. As permitted by Iowa
law, the state appealed to determine the question
of law without prejudice to the defendant, who
would remain free regardless of the decision on
appeal.
The Supreme Court of Iowa held that venue
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt but
that it may be inferred from circumstantial, as
well as direct, evidence. Therefore, it may be
presumed prima facie, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, that an instrument was forged in
the county where it was uttered or attempted to be
uttered. But such presumption depends upon proof
that the uttering was by the same person charged
with the alteration, or that the one so charged had
possession of the instrument where the uttering
occurred. In this case the appellate court concluded such proof had been established merely by
the uncorroborated stamped endorsement which
followed the forged endorsement and which was of
a bank within the proper county for venue purposes. The issue of venue should therefore have
been presented to the jury for determination of
whether it had been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, the case was reversed but not
remanded.
Comment: A scant majority of the states require venue to be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt whereas the remainder only require a preponderance of the evidence.
Elapse Of Time Between Arrest And Search
Not Fatal To Legal Search-Peoplev. Nugara, 236
N.E.2d 693 (Ill. 1968). Police arrested two men
standing in front of a hosiery shop at 3:00 A.M. on
November 7, 1964. The lock cylinder had been
removed from the door of the shop and one of the
two men, Shubmehl, was seen inserting a screwdriver into the part of the door where the cylinder
had been. At the police station, the suspects were
questioned as to whether they had a car parked
near the hosiery shop. Shubmehl at first denied
such but later admitted it and gave the car keys
to the police with permission to look through the
car. Upon investigating, the police found a claw
hammer, two screwdrivers and a pair of pliers in
the trunk of the automobile. Based on this evidence, both of the defendants were convicted of
attempted burglary and sentenced to one to five
years. In addition, Shubmehi was convicted of the
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possession of burglary tools and given one to two
years for this offense, his sentences to run concurrently. Both defendants appealed.
The major issue presented on appeal was whether
the search was lawful. The defendants, citing
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964),
argued that the burglary tools should have been
suppressed because the search which uncovered
them was not incident to the arrest. But the court
held the search to be lawful on the basis of Cooper
v. California,386 U.S. 58 (1967), where the search
of an impounded automobile was upheld despite
the fact that the search occurred one week after the
arrest. Here, as in Cooper, the court determined
that there was a dose connection between the
reason that the defendant was arrested and the
reason that the car was impounded and searched.
Both revolved around the burglary and burglary
tools.
The appellate court agreed with the other
evidentiary rulings of the trial court and held that
the defendants had waived the defense of intoxication by not raising it at the trial level. The convictions were thus affirmed.
Comment: Although Cooper appeared to depart
from the broad exclusionary rule of Preston it was
a 5 to 4 decision wherein much weight was placed
on a California law requiring the automobile to
be impounded "as evidence" in such a narcotics
case. Mention was made of the necessity to search
and take an inventory of the articles within such
a car in order to protect the police from false
claims. No such law nor necessity exists in Nugara.
But the constitutional principle behind Cooper
must be the close connection between the arrest
and the search, a test based on the reasons motivating the police to conduct the search.
No Obligation To Believe Uncontradicted Alibi
Testimony Over Positive Identification-People v.
Habdas, 236 N.E. 2d 731 (1l. App. 1968). In the
early hours of Friday, September 16, 1966, several typewriters and other equipment were taken
from a Downers Grove school building and left
in a ditch. Two police officers on routine patrol
duty had happened upon the burglary in progress
at about 2:15 A.M. The policemen ran toward
the school entrance doors, 60 feet off the street,
where they saw a blue-green 1961 Mercury automobile and two men in the light from two overhead bulbs. One suspect jumped into the automobile and sped past the police officers, but not
before one of the policemen had identified the first

four digits of the license number. About fifteen
minutes later the defendant Habdas was arrested
driving an automobile matching the description
and license number of the automobile used in the
burglary. At the trial by jury, both policemen
identified Habdas as the man whose face they had
seen as he drove away from the school building.
Habdas was found guilty of burglary with intent
to commit theft and sentenced to three to eight
years. He appealed.
The major ground on which the defendant
appealed was that the evidence adduced at trial
failed to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Habdas had testified at the trial that he
was at the place of his employment at the time
that the crime occurred. The prosecution entered
no evidence to contradict this alibi other than the
identification by the two police officers. The
appellate court nevertheless sustained the guilty
verdict, holding that the trial court and jury were
not obligated to believe alibi testimony over positive identification by credible witnesses even
where the alibi evidence and alibi witnesses may
be greater in number than those identifying the
accused. The court further stated that the defendant had impeached his own testimony by
stating that his working hours only extended to
midnight on Thursday nights and by failing to
call his employer to corroborate his alibi. Therefore, the verdict was proper and the judgment
was affirmed.
Photographs Held To Be Prejudicial, And
Inflammatory-State v. Poe, 441 P. 2d 512. (Utah
1968); Blue v. State, 235 N.E. 2d 471 (Ind. 1968).
The Supreme Courts of Indiana and Utah both
held the introduction of photographs reversible
error in a robbery and murder case respectively.
In Blue, "mug shots" of the defendants with the
usual classic three poses was excluded because it
suggested that the defendants had a criminal
record. Only when such issue-defendants' pastis relevant to the case or raised at trial can the
introduction of the pictures be allowable. Moreover, this includes pictures taken at the time of
arrest for the crime being tried.
In Poe, the defendant successfully appealed the
death penalty by arguing that color slides of the
victim was prejudicial error. The pictures showed
a bloody and gruesome corpse. The court explained
that if the pictures were relevant, their inflammatory nature could be overlooked. In this case,
however, other testimony would have sufficed.
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"The only use of the slides from the prosecution's
standpoint," it said, "was to arouse the emotions
of the jury so that they would not recommend life
imprisonment." The dissent vigorously argued that
there is nothing "inherently" prejudicial about
color photographs and, at any rate, such questions
are best left to the discretion of the trial court.
Statements Of Accused's Past Conduct Held
To Be Hearsay Under California Code-People v.
Lew, 441 P. 2d 942 (cal. 1968). The defendant
appealed a second degree murder conviction to the
California Supreme Court claiming error from the
admission of prejudicial hearsay. The facts indicate that he and the deceased were sexually
intimate although the defendant was married. On
the day of the killing, the deceased indicated a
desire to fire the defendant's pistol; an eyewitness
observed that the deceased was cheerful and carefree. Defendant testified that the gun fired accidentally. There was no evidence of a struggle.
The statements sought to be excluded were
made by the deceased at various times to friends
and associates which tended to prove that the
defendant had, in the past, threatened the deceased with violence. Thus, the testimony was
introduced to show the deceased state of mind on
the day of her death as permitted under the
statutory California evidence law. This would
indicate that the deceased never would have
handled a gun in the defendant's presence.
The court, while holding the statements as
falling within the state of mind exception to the
hearsay rule, nonetheless excluded them because
they referred to the defendant's past conduct, and
because the credibility of the deceased was suspect.
The dissent noted, however, that the test for
credibility is that there be no motive to deceive on
behalf of the speaker; and in accounts of the
deceased's tales; he found her sincere. He concluded that the majority's "rule of automatic
and selfexclusion"
is "unduly narrow
contradictory."
Prosecution's Failure To Disclose Evidence
Even Though Not Requested By Defendant Held
Denial Of Due Process-People v. Murdock, 237
N.E. 2d 442 (III. 1968). The defendant, convicted
of burglary, rape and murder, claimed that he was
denied due process since the prosecution concealed
evidence which was helpful to him. The defendant
had pleaded not guilty to the rape and murders
charges, but guilty to the burglary charge. His
defense was that some other person had raped and
murdered the deceased before or after he bur-
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glarized the premises of the victim. The defendant's
fingerprints were found on the window and the
prosecution argued that, since all the doors were
locked, the defendant must have been the only
person in the room. The undisclosed testimony of
a witness indicated that the front door was open,
and thus the defendant's theory that another
person entered and committed the rape and murder
was more credible. The Illinois Supreme Court
ordered a new trial. Justice Schaefer concurred,
arguing that the defendant should have been
represented by counsel at the coroner's inquest
besides being informed at trial of the prosecution's
witness.
Illinois Interprets Massiah To Exclude All
Incriminating
Post-Indictment
StatementsPeople v. Lagardo, 237 N.E. 2d 484 (III. 1968).
The defendant, after indictment but before trial,
made incriminating statements to police which
were not induced or deliberately elicited by them.
Counsel was not present at that time. The Illinois
Supreme Court ruled that the statements were
inadmissible on the authority of Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The court found that
the statement was a ". . . direct product of the
post-indictment questioning and, while perhaps
not directly responsive thereto, may not be
classified as volunteered."
Knowledge Or Intent Necessary To Prove
Aiding And Abetting-State v. Myers, 108 N.W.
2d 717 (Iowa 1968). The defendant was convicted
for aiding and abetting another who robbed a
service station. A short time after the hold-up was
reported to the authorities, a policeman on patrol
noticed a car driving after dark with its lights out.
The defendant was driving the car; a man later
identified as the one who committed the robbery
was alongside on the front seat. When the officers
turned on a red stop light, the other man ducked
down before the car stopped. The officer observed
a piece of brown cloth sticking out under the car
seat. A later search revealed that the robbery
tools and the stolen money were under the front
seat.
The defendant argued on appeal that these facts
do not establish the crime of aiding and abetting.
The Iowa Supreme Court held that while knowledge and intent must be shown, circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to prove the existence of these
elements. The totality of the circumstances
established guilt even though each fact by itself
was insignificant.
Confrontation For Identification "Critical Stage"
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And Requires Counsel-State v. Wright, 161 S.E.
2d 581 (N.C. 1968). The defendant, an illiterate
with an IQ of 62, was convicted for rape, after
being arrested as a "Peeping Tom." The prosecutrix identified the defendant in a line-up, after he
was required to walk, talk and change into clothes
similar to those worn by the culprit. The defendant
claimed that he broke into the prosecutrix's house,
but denied the charge of rape. Before the line-up
and demonstration, the defendant was given
Mirandawarnings. He signed a waiver for answering questions by marking an "X' on the paper; he
gave oral consent for the line-up and demonstration but refused to sign anything.
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that
the defendant should have been provided with a
lawyer during the line-up confrontation and the
subsequent demonstration. The court relied on
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and
Gilbert v. State of California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967),
to hold that the critical state of pretrial procedures
which require the presence of counsel is the confrontation during the line-up and the subsequent
identification. With regard to the walking, talking
and changing into other clothes, the court analogized the situation to those of sampling blood, hair
or clothing and outside the ambit of the Fifth
Amendment according to Schmerber v. State of
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). However, the
court explained ". . . when performed by the
accused for purposes of identification by the
prosecutrix they then become part of a 'critical'
stage requiring the presence of counsel unless that
right has been voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived."
The written waiver with regard to answering
questions was held valid. Yet, the oral waiver for
the demonstration was to no effect. The demonstration was at the "critical" stage of the trial-not
a pretrial investigation-and thus an attorney was
required.
Investigative Questioning Under MirandaCommonwealth v. Barclay,240 A. 2d 838 (Pa. 1968).
Defendant was convicted of drag racing. Statements made by the accused to an investigating
officer in the accused's home were admitted into
evidence even though the accused was not given
warning of his constitutional right to silence and
his right to an attorney.
The court, in affirming the conviction, distinguished between investigative and custodial
questioning. The court concluded that the defendant during the conversation was not in custody or

otherwise deprived of his freedom. The court
reasoned that the defendant was in no way deprived of his freedom of action, that he was free to
come and go, that he could have requested the
officer to leave his home, and that the officer at the
time of the questioning had no authority to arrest
the defendant.
The dissent found the questioning to be
custodial. It defined custody as occurring when
police are focusing on a person as a suspect in an
alleged crime or when a person is lead to believe
that he is being deprived of his freedom of action
or movement under the pressure of the police.
The fact that the police had no warrant and did
not intend to arrest the defendant is of no consequence since at the time of the investigation the
officer had a fairly clear notion that the defendant
was racing and the defendant knew immediately
that he was the focal point of the investigation.
Custodial Questioning Under Miranda-People
v. Ceccone, 67 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Ct. App. 1968).
Defendant was convicted of the possession of
marihuana. The police had stopped defendant's
car for going through a red light, and they noticed
paper bags in the car. Upon questioning the
defendant stated the bags contained marihuana.
The court reversed the conviction, because the
defendant's statement to the officer that the bag
contained marihuana should have been excluded
from evidence under Miranda. The court determined that at the time of the questioning, the
defendant was in custody, for police had probable
cause to suspect that the defendant was driving a
stolen car, had illegal possession of drugs, and he
should have been warned of his constitutional
rights. The court defined custody to mean when a
reasonable person is led to believe that he is
physically deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. The court rejected the arguments
that the questioning was merely to confirm the
officer's suspicion and to allow the defendant to
exonerate himself.
Transcript Of Arraignment Required-Martinez
v. State, 438 P. 2d 893 (Idaho 1968). Defendant,
unrepresented by counsel at the arraignment,
waived the right to an attorney and pleaded guilty
to the charge of rape. The defendant on appeal
contended that he was not informed of his right to
an attorney prior to his waiver. There was no
record of the arraignment proceedings, but the
arraignment judge testified that he informed the
defendant of his rights.
In reversing the conviction, the court held that
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when there are no records of prior proceedings, the
defendant is deprived through no fault of his own
the opportunity of establishing facts to demonstrate the illegality of his incarceration. The lack
of a transcript of the arraignment proceedings
resulted in a breakdown of the judicial process and
constituted a deprivation of due process.
The dissent argued that the court should apply
the usual test of credibility to evaluate the conflicting allegations and evidence, since there was
the testimony of the arraignment judge and sheriff,
and the clerk's minute entry that the accused was
advised of his rights.
Intelligent Waiver Of Counsel-Commonwealth
v. Russell, 240 A. 2d 559 (Pa. 1968). One, McKee,
was paroled after serving a short term on a burglary
charge, but shortly after parole he was convicted
of an additional larceny count and was required to
serve the remainder of the sentence on the first
conviction as well as an additional term. In a
habeas corpus petition he attacked the validity of
the first conviction on the grounds that he was
deprived of his constitutional right to assistance
of counsel. The court held that the state had
failed to meet its burden of proof that counsel had
been intelligently and understandingly waived.
The court ruled that a signature of the accused at
the bottom of a printed statement waiving counsel
and the testimony of an assistant district attorney
that the trial judge ordinarily offered counsel to
accused, although he could not remember that the
judge had advised this particular accused of his
rights, was insufficient to show intelligent waiver
of the right to counsel.
Prejudicial Instruction On Absence Of The
Defendant From The Stand-State v. Dent, 241 A.
2d 833 (N.J. 1968). Defendants were convicted of
a robbery-murder and sentenced to death. The
principal witness for the state was a juvenile
participant in the crime who had already been
sentenced to an indeterminate term in the reformatory. Neither of the defendants testified in his own
behalf. The judge advised the jury that the
defendants had a constitutional right to remain
silent. But he then gave the following instruction:
One of the things you may consider in weighing
the truth of the evidence produced for the State is
the absence of any witness for the defendants
to say, that they were not at the Caruso [the
victim's] home .... No witness that I can recall
testified that they were somewhere else asleep in
bed or doing something else. You may consider
that.
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The court held that since there were no witnesses
other than defendants who had personal knowledge
of the event, the effect of the instruction was to
direct the attention of the jury to the failure of the
defendants to testify. The instruction, the court
held, violated the defendants' Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent. The court decided that the
other portion of the charge about the right to
silence did not overcome the prejudicial effect of
the instruction which pointed out the failure to
testify.
Evidence Discovered Through Search Founded
On Consent Obtained By Improper Assertion Of
Authority Inadmissible-People v. Johnson, 440 P.
2d 921 (Cal. 1968). The defendant appealed his
conviction of possession of heroin. He contended
that no effective consent had been given to the
search through which the heroin was uncovered.
A "reliable informer" told the police a man
named Cooper was selling heroin in his room at a
named hotel. The officers went to the hotel to talk
to Cooper. They saw him in the hall, stopped him,
and asked him about possible sales of heroin. He
was searched and found to be carrying about $100
in small bills but no heroin. Cooper told the police
they could search his hotel room and gave them
the key. As an officer was unlocking the door, the
defendant opened it from the inside. Upon seeing
the '0fficers, the defendant turned around and put
his hand toward his face. One officer asked the
defendant to turn around and open his mouth.
When the defendant did so, the officer saw a
balloon in his mouth. The defendant was asked to
spit out the balloon. It contained the heroin. The
officers did not have a warrant to arrest or search
either the defendant or Cooper.
Defense counsel asked for the name of the
informer. This name was withheld to protect the
informer's life. The prosecuting attorney stated
that the name need be revealed only if the information received from the informer is the sole basis
of probable cause and that, in the present case, the
prosecution was relying upon the consent to enter
the room and the observations of the officers once
the door was opened.
The Supreme Court of California reversed the
defendant's conviction. It reasoned that when the
question of the legality of an arrest or search and
seizure is raised at trial, the defendant makes oift
a prima facie case when he establishes an arrest
was made without a warrant or that private
premises were entered or a search made without a
warrant. The burden then rests on the prosecution
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to show proper justification. If consent is relied
upon as the justification for a search, the state has
the burden of showing lawful consent was given.
This means the State had to show that the consent
to enter the room was not a mere submission to
authority and was not inextricably bound up with
unlawful conduct. A search and seizure made
pursuant to consent obtained immediately after an
illegal arrest or entry cannot be segregated from
the illegal conduct. The court reversed the defendant's conviction because it concluded the
search of Cooper was illegal, Cooper's consent to
enter the hotel room was therefore invalid, making
the evidence secured by the prosecution, as the
fruit of that consent, inadmissible.
The court concluded that the search of Cooper's
hotel room was illegal because the police did not
have probable cause. Under the laws applicable at
the time of the trial, information received from an
informer could not form the basis of probable
cause when the prosecution refused to identify him,
and the defense showed that it was relying upon
the failure to identify the informer as making the
search illegal. Even under the rules applicable at
the time of this review, the informer's statements
could not form the basis of probable cause since
there was no showing in court, beyond the officer's
opinion, that the informer was reliable or credible.
Since there was nothing apart from the information
obtained from the informer to furnish probable
cause, the court concluded the search of Cooper in
the hall was unlawful. Succeeding events were so
intimately connected with the officer's illegal
conduct that the evidence acquired must be held
to be the result of that conduct. The defendant's
conviction had to be reversed because, once the
evidence obtained through the search was excluded,
there was no evidence of guilt of the crime charged.
Admissibility Of Incriminating StatementsTruex v. State, 210 So.2d 424 (Ala. 1968); State v.
Davis, 157 N.W. 2d 907 (Iowa 1968). In each of
these cases a state supreme court held certain
incriminating statements made by the defendants
were admissible in evidence. In each case the court
considered the effect of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
Truex involved a defendant convicted of first
degree murder. Upon appeal Truex contended it
was error to allow in evidence the testimony of the
sister of the deceased to the effect that the defendant came to her house and told her to come with
him to see something; that she found the deceased;
that she asked the defendant what happened to the

deceased; and that the defendant replied, "I killed
her. But I loved her."
The Alabama Supreme Court rejected the contention that this testimony was inadmissible since
the sister of the deceased did not appraise the
defendant of his constitutional right to remain
silent and affirmed Truex' conviction. The court
held that the substance of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964), and Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), "have no application when confessions
or admissions otherwise admissible are given to
persons who are not officers of the law nor their
agents."
The defendant also contended it was error to
permit a police officer who wascalled to the scene
to testify to remarks the defendant made to him.
This officer testified he arrived on the scene and,
when he asked the defendant what happened, the
defendant responded, "Baby, I told you I loved
you. I told you I would kill you if you didn't go
with me."
The court ruled that this testimony was admissible in spite of the fact that the officer did not
appraise the defendant of his constitutional rights
since the officer made no effort to take the defendant into custody or question him further, but
simply waited for the sheriff to arrive. This court
felt this situation did not involve such custodial
interrogation as the Escobedo and Miranda decisions were concerned with.
Davis involved a defendant convicted of breaking and entering. Upon this appeal, the defendant
admitted that he had been given shortly after his
arrest the warnings required by Miranda but
contended that a certain statement was inadmissible since the state failed to show that at the time
this statement was obtained he was again advised
of his rights so that he effectively waived his right
to counsel.
The defendant was apprehended on the roof of a
bakery which had been broken into. One investigating officer observed two cans of beer and a tire
iron on a table in the bakery at the time the
defendant and a companion were arrested. After
the defendant was arrested, he was given the
required warnings. He was then taken to a hospital
for treatment of an ankle injured when he jumped
off the roof.
While the defendant was in the hospital and
about one and one half hours after the time he was
arrested, he made the statement in question. The
officer who had observed the beer on the table said
in reference thereto that the defendant and his
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companion must have been planning to stay for a a $500 fine. Upon appeal he contended that this
while since they had their cold beer with them. sentence was excessive. The appellate court did
The defendant responded, "Yes, but we did not not reach this contention. It affirmed the defendhave a chance to drink it."
ant's conviction, but reversed and remanded the
When the officer was asked to relate his conver- sentence for a hearing in aggravation and mitisation with the defendant at the hospital and before gation.
the officer had an opportunity to answer, defense
The court interpreted Ill. Rev. Stat. ch 38
counsel objected and asked that the testimony be
§1-7(g) (1965):
stricken because there was no direct testimony that
For the purpose of determining sentence to be
this officer had advised the defendant of his rights.
imposed, the court shall, after conviction, consider
The objection was overruled and the officer testified
the evidence, if any, as to the moral character, life,
to the conversation and statement in question. No
family, occupation and criminal record of the ofmotion to strike was made at this time. At the
fender and may consider such evidence in aggravaconclusion of the cross-examination of the officer,
tion or mitigation of the offense.
defense counsel moved to strike the testimony on
the grounds previously indicated and because the Although noting that Illinois appellate courts have
questioning was done when the accused was in differed in their interpretation of this section, the
such great pain that is was a form of duress by the court rejected the state's contention that a hearing
questioning officer. This motion was overruled. in aggravation and mitigation is not mandatory.
The Supreme Court of Iowa concluded both the It concluded that the legislative spirit and intent
objection and the motion to strike were properly was to make such a hearing mandatory unless
overruled because they were not specific enough to understandingly waived by the defendant and not
advise the trial court why this statement was requested by the state. This court, considering its
power to reduce the sentence imposed by the trial
inadmissible.
The Davis court went on to consider whether the court, felt it was essential that the reviewing court
officer's testimony violated United States Supreme have before it information as to the defendant's
Court decisions regarding procedural safeguards moral character, life, family, occupation and
against self-incrimination. It concluded that the criminal record, if any, as provided for in Section
conversation between the officer and the defendant
1-7(g).
neither took place under the circumstances nor
The court concluded that since a hearing in
constitituted the type of interrogation contem- aggravation and mitigation is mandatory proplated by Miranda. The defendant was not in a cedure prior to sentencing, the state has the
police-dominated atmosphere. The officer was not burden of showing the defendant expressly and
interrogating the defendant, but was making a understandingly waived his right to such a hearing.
remark in a conversational manner when. the Because the record of this case did not disclose that
defendant made the incriminating statement. This either a hearing in aggravation and mitigation or a
court stated that it recognized the rationale of probation hearing was held, the court held that
Miranda, shared deep concern for justice and the state had not carried its burden. Consequently
desired to render every man, whether innocent or the defendant's conviction was affirmed but the
guilty, what was due him. A balance must be sentence was reversed and remanded for consideramaintained which does justice not only to the tion of the matter of probation and, should
accused, but also to society. The court would not probation be denied, a hearing in aggravation and
subscribe to an interpretation of a rule which mitigation.
tended to thwart rather than secure justice.
Trial Judge's Comment Reversible ErrorThis court stated further that even if the admis- Beckham v. State, 209 So.2d 687 (Fla. Ct. App.
sion of the defendant's statement was error, it was 1968). The defendant appealed from a conviction
not prejudicial to him. Since he was caught on the for manslaughter. He contended the trial judge
premises, the acceptance of his admission into committed reversible error in stating: "This was
evidence would seem to amount to harmless error. the gun found at the scene of the crime by the
Right To Hearing In Aggravation And Mitiga- chain of the testimony here, and I overrule your
tion-People v. Sessions, 238 N.E.2d 94 (Ill. Ct. objection and admit it into evidence." The District
App. 1968). The defendant was found guilty of Court of Appeals of Florida agreed that this was
battery and sentenced to six months in jail plus reversible error even though the trial judge at-
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tempted to correct himself. The trial judge told
the jury it was not to take the court's use of the
phrase "scene of the crime" as an indication of an
idea, inference or implication on the part of the
court that the court felt any particular crime had
taken place. The judge amended his statement to
say "at the scene of the alleged crime" and directed
the jury to disregard the earlier statement.
The appellate court described the trial judge's
statement as inadvertent; but it felt that his effort
to correct the statement was not a refutation of
his belief that a crime had been committed and
thus the statement was harmfully prejudicial.
Therefore the inadvertent statement constituted
reversible error.
The appellate court also considered the trial
judge's repetition of the manslaughter charge in
his instructions to the jury. This charge was given
to the jury four times. The court concluded that
this was also harmfully prejudicial. The conviction
was reversed and remanded on the basis of both
prejudicial errors.
Adequate Oath-Taking By Young ChildrenPeople v. Berry, 67 Cal. Rptr. 312 (Ct. App. 1968).
Berry was convicted of three counts of committing
lewd and lascivious acts upon the body of a child.
Two young children, one six and the other nine,
testified as prosecution witnesses concerning acts
committed upon them by the defendant. Upon
appeal, Berry contended neither juvenile witness
was properly qualified and that the failure of the
trial court to swear in each of these witnesses as
adults constituted reversible error. The appellate
court rejected this argument and affirmed Berry's
conviction.
The court stated: at 314:
It is not necessary that a juvenile witness entertain
a religious belief or conviction, nor that the child
have any detailed knowledge of the nature of the
oath, but it is sufficient that the child understand
that some earthly evil will befall if the truth is
not disclosed.
The court held it was not incumbent upon the
trial court to inquire whether these prosecuting
witnesses understood the meaning of the adult
oath. It was sufficient that the nine year old
witness said she knew what it meant to tell the
truth and that she would tell the truth. When the
court cautioned her that failure to tell the truth
after so promising constituted the crime of perjury,
she said she understood and promised to tell the
truth. The six year old witness said she knew what

it meant to tell the truth and not to tell the truth.
She stated she would not lie and would tell the
truth if she promised the court to do so. The
appellate court also cited indications from the
record that the prosecuting witnesses were in fact
competent. The younger witness knew her last
name, her age, her birthdate, her class in school
and the name of her teacher. She dearly described
the surroundings and manner in which the acts
were committed. The nine year old displayed
similar clear knowledge and understanding, clearly
described the acts of Berry, and was aware of the
dates and surrounding circumstances.
This court held that if Berry was dissatisfied
with the answers of the prosecuting witnesses to
questions directed toward their understanding of
the oath, he had the responsibility to request
further inquiry. Since the defense counsel did not
make such a request or object at the trial to the
testimony of either prosecuting witness on the
basis that she was incompetent, the ground for
objection is considered waived. The court held
further that the appellant's contention concerning
the inadequacy of the court's oath-taking is a
procedural matter similarly waived by failure to
make timely objection and by proceeding with
cross-examination of the witnesses.
Plain Error In Insanity Instruction-Parker v.
State, 241 A.2d 185 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968).
Parker was convicted of first degree murder and
robbery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on
the murder charge and to a consecutive twentyyear term on the robbery conviction.
The appellant's principle defense was insanity at
the time of the commission of the crime. A psychiatrist for the defense testified that Parker, at
the time of the crime, had a "character behavior
disorder" and, in addition, "an acute brain syndrome secondary to alcohol ingestion-severe
alcohol ingestion." He testified that the appellant
had impaired comprehension and judgement,
impairment to the extent "that he was unable to
comprehend that if he did something which was
violent, what the consequences may do-be."
He was unable, however, to say Parker "absolutely
did not know right from wrong."
The trial court ruled this testimony sufficiently
rebutted the presumption of sanity to permit the
issue to go to the jury. The state called a psychiatrist who testified that Parker's condition was a
character disorder with chronic alcoholism, but
that Parker did not suffer from any disease which
could have caused him to be in such a state of
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mind to be unable to know right from wrong and
that he was "probably responsible" for his actions
at the time of the commission of the crime.
The trial court instructed the jury on the issue
of the burden of proof of insanity as follows:
".... the burden of proof is upon the defendant to
establish insanity by a preponderance of the
evidence; but then the burden shifts to the State
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was
sane." The appellate court held this instruction was
clearly erroneous, citing Bradford v. State, 234 Md.
505 (1964) and Fowler v. State, 237 Md. 508 (1965).
The jury should have been instructed that the burden of proof is on the state to prove the defendant
sane beyond a reasonable doubt.
The appellate court disapproved of the given
instruction because it informed the jury that, even
though the presumption of sanity had been
sufficiently rebutted to go to the jury, the appellant
would nevertheless have to prove his insanity by
a preponderance of the evidence before the burden
of proof shifted to the state to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was sane.
This court reversed and remanded for a new
trial in spite of the fact that the appellant made no
objection to the court's instructions. It felt the
instant case fell under the Maryland rule which
allows reviewing courts to take cognizance of and
correct plain error in the instructions even though
no objection was made. Since the appellant's basic
defense was insanity, this error in the instructions
was a fundamental one which could not be considered harmless.
Victim's Inability To Pick Out Both Of His
Assailants In A Line-up Leads To Reversal For
Both-Rath v. State, 240 A.2d 777 (Md. App.
1968). In June, 1962 George Gowans, an employee
of a service station, was robbed by two men, who
he described to the police. Following this description the Maryland State Police received information that three men fitting the description were
being held in Pennsylvania. After serving time for
a charge in Pennsylvania two of the men, the
defendants, were returned to Maryland. They were
tried without a jury and each found guilty of
robbery with a deadly weapon on July 21, 1967.
Each was sentenced to a term of five years.
Before the trial, on July 13, 1967, Mr. Gowans
participated in a line-up of six men all similar in
age and height to the defendants Donald Rath and
Charles Sanders. At that time he picked out two
men who he said had robbed him five years previously. One of the men he chose was Sanders, but

[Vol. 60

the other was in no way involved in the crime.
After these identifications a Maryland State
Policeman informed the victim that one of the
men he picked was not involved in the robbery.
Mr. Gowans replied that he was satisfied with his
identification of one of the men, and that he was
mistaken about the other, but he did not say
which man he was sure of, Sanders or the innocent
man.
On the morning of the trial the victim was in
the offices of the State's Attorney. There he
admitted observing two pictures of the two defendants. Neither defendant offered evidence in his own
behalf and each moved for a judgement of acquittal
after the state's case.
The appellate court reversed for both defendants. It said that in light of the fact that
Mr. Gowans did not clarify which of the two
identifications he was satisfied with, the showing
to him of a picture of each of the defendants before
the trial and asking him if these were the two men
who had robbed him, so tainted his in-court
identification, not only of Rath but also of Sanders
that the conviction could not stand.
The court said that it realized that the historical
practice in Maryland was to permit the trial court
to weigh a courtroom identification, but it was also
aware of the rationale of the Supreme Court in
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and
the exclusionary rule established there. It said that
under the circumstances of the present case the
rationale in Wade and Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967), was clearly apposite. The actions
of the authorities after Mr. Gowans picked out an
innocent man at the lineup and failed to identify
Rath, caused the defendants to be denied a fair
trial.
A Delay Of 148 Days Between Issuance Of A
Warrant And Arrest Does Not Impair The Right
To A Speedy Trial-People v. Love, 235 N.E.2d
819 (Ill. 1968). A complaint charging the defendant
with leaving the scene of an accident resulted in a
warrant issued on October 10, 1966. The defendant,
however, was not arrested until March 8, 1967.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the
grounds that a delay of 148 days from the issuance
of a warrant until arrest was in violation of the
constitutional right to a speedy trial.
ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTES, ch. 38, §103-5
(1967) provides that a person in custody shall be
placed on trial within 120 days from the date he
was taken into custody or if he is on bail, within
120 days from the date he demands trial. The
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statute does not deal with delays between the
issuance of a warrant and arrest, but another
section (103-5(c)) allows a delay of 180 days from
arrest to trial in special circumstances. The court
viewed this statute as a legislative expression of the
right to a speedy trial which the court ought to
consider in deciding the issue. The court held that
the delay preceding the arrest which was for a
lesser period of time than the permissible delay
under the statute following arrest did not deny
the defendant his right to a speedy trial. The
decision was also based on the failure of the defendant to show that the delay was intentional or to
show specific instances of prejudice that resulted
from the delay.
Conduct Of Police In Breaking Down The
Defendant's Door Only Twenty Seconds After
Announcing Their Office Held To Make The
Subsequent Search Illegal-Comntnwealth v.
Newman, 240 A.2d 795 (Penn. 1968). Appellant
was convicted of trafficing in lottery tickets and
appealed. The superior court affirmed. The
supreme court reversed because the police conduct
in excuting the search warrant violated the Fourth
Amendment.
On November 16, 1964 four detectives went to
the defendant's home with both a body warrant
and a search warrant. The complaint supporting
the warrant alleged that the defendant was suspected of running a lottery. As the police approached the premises they saw the defendant
talking on the phone next to a second story
window. They approached and knocked, announcing their office. After a wait of only twenty seconds
they proceded to break down appelant's door with
a sledge hammer. They had no reason to believe
that the defendant was attempting to flee or that
he was destroying evidence. The officers never
announced their purpose, although there was no
substantial reason to believe that the defendant
knew it. After entering the detectives discovered
lottery tickets that were used in the prosecution of
the defendant.
The supreme court, passing the question of the
validity of the issuance of the warrant, held that
the present procedure violated the Fourth Amendment. The court said that Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23 (1963), requires that the method of entry
be "reasonable." In the absence of any Pennsylvania statute, several Pennsylvania cases have
used 19 U.S.C. §3109 as a definition of what is
"reasonable." That statute requires that the
officer announce both his office and his purpose

before breaking open any door. Two United States
District Court opinions, both on writs of habeas
corpus from the Pennsylvania courts have established this requirement in that state. United States
ex rel. Manduchi v. Tracy, 233 F. Supp. 423
(C.D.Pa. 1964); United States ex rel. Ametrane v.
Gable, 276 F. Supp. 555 (E.D.Pa.1967).
The supreme court agreed with the United
States Supreme Court when it said in Miller v.
United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958), that the burden
of making an express announcement is slight, a
few words are all that are required to satisfy the
Constitution.
The supreme court could find nothing in the
record to support a belief that the defendant was
either fleeing or destroying evidence. Both of
these were established as justification for failure
to fully announce office and purpose. Specifically,
the court said that a mere twenty second delay in
answering the door cannot support any such belief.
The court pointed out that in Arnetrane there had
been a delay of over a minute, and still the police
were not justified in breaking down the door. The
court appreciated that some lottery paraphernalia
is easily destroyed, but it said that this fact does
not justify the suspension of the Fourth Amendment in all lottery cases.
The Fourth Amendment requires that the lawfulness of entry be determined at the time of
entry, not later. Here the entry violated the Fourth
Amendment and the evidence uncovered is subject
to the exclusionary rule.
Doing Eighty In A Seventy Mile An Hour
Zone O.K-State v. Bratten, 236 N.E.2d 683
(Ohio App. 1967). The defendant was convicted
of violating an Ohio statute making it illegal to
drive at a speed greater than was reasonably safe
or proper. The two state's witnesses, two police
officers, testified that he was doing eighty miles
per hour on an interstate highway which was
posted at seventy miles per hour.
On cross-examination, however, the officers
testified that the road was dry, visibility was
virtually unlimited and in brief, "driving conditions were perfect at the time in question." The
officers further testified that there was little or
no other traffic, and that the defendant's car had
no difficulty stopping within the assured clear
distance ahead.
The appelate court held that with this evidence
the state failed to establish a violation of the
statute.

